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The ‘skill model’ of virtue has received increasing levels of attention over the past decade, at least 
partly due to its prominence in the work of Julia Annas (2011, 1995). Building on this earlier work, 
some of which is his own, Matt Stichter now delivers a bold and empirically grounded new book, 
The Skillfulness of Virtue (2018), an extended defense of the skill model of virtue that utilizes the 
available psychological research on self-regulation and practical expertise. Stichter examines the 
idea (familiar in antiquity) that the virtues might be analogous to practical skills, and he defends a 
very strong version of this thesis, that the virtues actually just are a special kind of practical skill.1 
A morally virtuous person is one who achieves expertise in moral skills; and he helpfully extends 
this empirically grounded thesis beyond the case of ethics, to encompass epistemic virtue as well. 
Stichter’s book makes a major contribution to virtue theory that will shape future research on the 
skill model of virtue in philosophy and moral psychology, but also potentially in empirical 
psychology and other disciplines. 
The Skillfulness of Virtue merits careful consideration. This symposium brings together six 
philosophers with widely varying philosophical orientations. The six contributors are Mark 
Alfano, Ellen Fridland, Bana Bashour, Scott Woodcock, Mara Neijzen, and myself. The first five 
papers were originally presented at the 2019 Pacific Division Meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association in Vancouver, Canada. The sixth paper (my own) was originally 
presented earlier, at the 2014 Kansas Philosophical Society meeting in response to a paper of 
Stichter’s that later developed into central sections of the book. The six papers have all of course 
been developed since their original presentation, most of them quite significantly. Few of the 
papers are anything like standard academic book reviews; and several make original philosophical 
contributions. In response to these central elements of the symposium, Stichter provides 
substantive replies to all six contributors, allowing him the final word here. The symposium should 
be of interest to anyone whose work touches on character development, practical skill, or the moral 
and epistemic virtues.  
 
1 On the skill model of virtue in antiquity, see Angier and Raphals (2021), Barney (2021), Annas (1993). 
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Mark Alfano’s paper (2020) leads the group with a helpful overview of Stichter’s book, 
especially in relation to recent work on empirical psychology, the situationist challenge, and the 
‘replication crisis’ in social psychology. Alfano challenges specific points made in almost every 
chapter, allowing Stichter to clarify his position. Ellen Fridland (2020) seeks to expand (rather 
than challenge) Stichter’s account of skill as a complex form of self-regulation. She suggests 
supplementing Stichter’s preferred account of mental schemas and mental models with an account 
of action schemas informed by recent psychological literature on motor skill. The suggestion is 
fruitful. Indeed, Fridland and Stichter have now collaborated on a paper that takes up Fridland’s 
suggestion in order to understand how a virtuous person can reliably act well in manner that is 
nevertheless spontaneous or intuitive, a hallmark of virtuous activity (Fridland and Stichter 2020). 
Bana Bashour (2021) nevertheless expresses some worries. Her paper deploys everyday examples 
of skill acquisition in order to argue that Stichter’s reliance on self-regulation and deliberate 
practice in skill acquisition—involving what Stichter refers to as goal setting and goal striving—
leaves him with an overly intellectualist account of virtue acquisition. Scott Woodcock’s insightful 
paper (2020) invites clarification from Stichter on three points in particular: the articulability of 
the virtuous person’s reasons, the role of motivation and practical wisdom in Stichter’s ‘virtue as 
skill’ account, and what Woodcock sees as the ‘indeterminacy’ of the virtues in comparison to 
non-moral expertise, in chess for example (this is the ‘action guiding’ objection to virtue ethics). 
Mara Neijzen (2021) presses another apparent disanalogy between virtue and skill. She argues that 
the general availability of thick ethical terms gives the virtue novice a robust starting point that the 
skill novice seems to lack. By contrast, my own paper (Birondo 2021) encourages Stichter to press 
the analogy further. Aristotle’s initial move away from the skill model of virtue leads us to 
overlook a cognitive-conative form of practical intelligence that unifies robust forms of practical 
expertise such as medicine. Insofar as the skill model of virtue is compelling, it needs to draw on 
a robust conception of expertise (similar to Greek technê) rather than the ordinary, anemic 
conception of practical skills. 
These six papers provide insights, from a wide variety of approaches, on Stichter’s novel 
defense of the skillfulness of virtue by enlisting recent psychological research on self-regulation 
and expertise. With the inclusion of Stichter’s careful replies, the symposium contributes to the 
expanding research on practical skill, practical wisdom, and virtue. The hope is that this 
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symposium, like The Skillfulness of Virtue itself, will contribute to a better understanding of moral 




Thanks are due to the twelve referees (two of them unknown to myself) for lending us their 
invaluable expertise. Special thanks to the contributors for their diligence and patience in the 
preparation of the papers. Most of all I wish to thank Matt Stichter for his support of this 
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